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ABSTRACT
This discussion material focuses on evaluating the long-run mean-
reverting properties of debt to GDP ratio by unit root approach. 
Findings demonstrate that the debt to GDP is mean-reverting over 
time, while there seems to be no evidence when this indicator is 
measured in real terms. Further, the material considers a fiscal 
policy reaction function to understand whether government pursued 
appropriate policies to avoid excessive debt accumulation. Results 
presume that fiscal authorities react systematically to raising debt ratio, 
by generating future surpluses, but not enough to avoid excessive 
debt accumulation. Comparing simultaneously results from both 
approaches implies that Albanian fiscal policy is sustainable. But, 
the profligacy of fiscal authorities put it at risk, considering that the 
pursued fiscal policies do not avoid excessive debt accumulation. 
Error term analysis reveals that fiscal policy has been stable across 
time, even though evidence seems to illustrate that global financial 
and economic crisis had a negative impact. However, evidence seems 
to suggest that fiscal policy is relatively volatile when public debt is 
close to or above the 60 per cent of GDP ratio.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, public debt, ADF and PP test, fiscal policy 
reaction function, pro-cyclicality and VAR approach 
JEL Classification: C12, C36, C39, H62, H63
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sustainability has become one of the most widely used concepts 
in assessing the behaviour of fiscal policy (FP). Although the exact 
definition of fiscal sustainability remains an open debate, almost 
everyone agrees that the sustainability of public finances is closely 
linked to the state of the financial situation of the government, 
which often represents the economical strength and stability of a 
country. An unsustainable FP, accompanied by high fiscal deficits 
or/and rising public debt will lead, sooner or later, to the need 
to review and accommodate the anticipated government revenues 
and expenditures. Thus, the need to revise the current FP is a sign 
of unsustainable public finances, while an adjustment caused by 
a loss of confidence in financial markets is generally much more 
costly. Moreover, the stability of FP is questionable when rising 
rates of debt to GDP reaches above a certain level and when the 
revenues are not sufficient to cover financing costs related to new 
levels of debt issued or when it is clear that the government needs 
are higher than the taxpayers can support.
The framework of the Albanian FP has been based on the anchor 
determined under programme arrangement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)1. As such, FP aimed at achieving consolidated 
budget balance through deficit and public debt reduction. For this 
reason, public finance focused on reducing current expenditures and 
increasing government revenues. As a result, budget deficit, in 2010, 
was gradually reduced to 3.2% of GDP from 9.6% in 1998, mainly 
through cuts in government subsidies and personnel expenditure and 
revenue inflows from the privatisation process. These developments 
reflect the decline in interest payments (cost of debt servicing) to 
GDP ratio, reaching to only 2.8 per cent in 2010, compared to 9.5 
per cent in1998. Public debt to GDP ratio has been within the IMF 
(2003) and European Union Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) bounds. 
Albanian economic growth performance has been deterministic for 
the debt declining ratio, even though, in nominal terms, debt growth 
has approximately exceeded real economic growth rate, mainly 
during the period from 2007 to 2009.
1 See: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF - 1998-2001), Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Growth (PREG - 2002-2005), which was extended to Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF - 2006-2009). In January 2009, Albania graduated from the Fund-
supported programme.
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Further, under debt management strategy, debt composition 
is orientated towards a rising tendency to borrow on foreign 
market, given greater accessability into the international financial 
institutions. Foreign debt ratio accounted to 40% of total debt in 
2010, from only 20% in 1998. This has provided more liquidity 
for credit to domestic household and firms, but in return has raised 
exposure to exchange rate volatility. The exposure of external debt 
to depreciation of ALL against both main currencies that compose 
the external debt stock, the euro and US dollar, increased the 
total level by round 2 percentage points2. Additionally, in nominal 
terms, debt burden has raised on faster grounds than government 
revenues. As a result, public debt level constitutes 220 per cent of 
total government revenues in 2010 compared to about 160 per 
cent in 1998.
 
Besides, during the financial and global crisis, the Albanian 
economy took advantage of macroeconomic stimulus in the form of 
fiscal expansion ahead of monetary adjustments. Buffer zones had 
been built in previous years through consolidation of fiscal position 
and anchoring of macroeconomic policies and public expectations, 
enabling such a countercyclical FP. Expanding budget deficit, hence 
public debt, reflected both the impact of automatic stabilizers in 
the form of reduced income and the countercyclical FP through 
wage and capital expenditure increases. This was reflected also 
into raising interest payments and primary deficits, even though, the 
government managed to have a primary surplus in 2010. 
Under such circumstances, the main question coming up relates 
to the analysis on whether Albanian public debt burden has reached 
the limit where there is less possibility to augment further. Thus, this 
discussion paper focuses on the question whether FP in the case 
of Albania tends to have a stable behaviour in the long run. In 
particular, the aim is to examine two aspects of the same question: 
(i) Firstly, is fiscal policy stable in the presence of economic 
developments? 
(ii) Secondly, do fiscal authorities pursue active policies to avoid 
excessive debt accumulation? 
2  See: Ministry of Finance (2010, 2011)
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According to IMF (2003), in developing and transition countries, 
the possibility for generating excessive surplus diminishes, while the 
level of debt burden moves toward 50 per cent of GDP ratio. This 
suggests that, while public debt exceeds the 50 per cent threshold, 
the behaviour of FP is questionable and cannot guarantee financial 
solvency without incurring further debt growth. Such a deterministic 
indicator gives clear signals and is easily interpreted. But, it is based 
on a subjective definition because there is no strong theoretical 
reason to link fiscal sustainability with the return of debt to GDP 
ratio to a former and not another level. Meanwhile, although in 
some cases high levels of deficit and debt may be appropriate, it is 
impossible for a country to adhere to a consistent ratio throughout 
the time. 
In terms of policymaking, information on appropriate stabilising 
measures may be less necessary when the country is already 
highly exposed to shocks such as sudden stops of capital. The 
implementation of this approach, therefore, does not take into 
account uncertainties associated with the volatility of economic 
growth, the price of primary exports, the interest and exchange rate 
movements. Determining a low ratio while the initial level is too 
high would require implementation of a tight FP for a long period 
of time [Jonas (2010)]. This, among others, could cause a decline 
in public investment and slowdown of potential economic growth. 
Meanwhile, determining a higher level would increase the level 
of debt to GDP ratio and interest payments and subsequent rise 
in general concerns about sustainability. Therefore, it is advisable 
to follow an empirical approach in order to have a preliminary 
correct answer. Beyond assisting a deterministic level, this method 
provides some distinct signals on the behaviour of FP by offering 
an investigation into the stochastic behaviour subject to long-run 
mean-reverting ability.
This empirical study is in coherence with a possible need to 
design and implement a form of “fiscal rule” in the case of Albania. 
It provides some incentives to highlight and anchor in advance the 
expectations in favour of monetary policy (MP). The development 
and performance of public debt is a direct responsibility of the 
Albanian Government. But, the Bank of Albania has traditionally 
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played an advisory role in the management process. This is because 
first, the Bank acts as a fiscal agent and adviser to the Government 
in public debt management. Second, the activity of public debt 
management policy can affect monetary policy. Moreover, within 
the framework of inflation targeting regime, the elimination of 
fiscal volatility caused by an unsustainable behaviour is the most 
important pre-condition for the implementation of MP.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the 
methodology for testing sustainability, the model and the data. 
Empirical results in Albania are presented in the following section. 
The paper concludes in section 4.
-11-
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A.  INTERTEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT, 
UNIT-ROOT TEST AND FISCAL POLICY 
REACTION FUNCTION APPROACH TO TEST 
FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
The traditional approach in evaluating the sustainability of fiscal 
policies is based on the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of the 
government. Fiscal policy is considered sustainable, if debt holders 
expect the current debt to be offset by the sum of excepted future 
discount primary budget surpluses3, expressed empirically by Bohn 
(1998) and Uctum (2006) as follows: 
         
∆Bt=-S+rBt-1 (1)
where, B is a measurement of government debt, S is the 
seignorage inclusive primary surplus and r is the ex-post interest 
that in the future government debt will mature and will eventuallybe 
repaid in full.This is also known as the transversality condition4. It 
implies that government debt is finite, while market will not tolerate 
Ponzi games under which new debt is issued systematically to cover 
interest payments on debt servicing [Cuddington, (1996)]. Based 
on these conditions, the hypothesis that the government is subject 
to IBC can be expressed mathematically as follows:
Bt=δt+nBt+n+∑i=1δt,iSt+i, (2)
where, δt+n=∏s=1(1+pt+s)-1 is the time-varing discount factor n 
periods ahead. A necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability 
is that, as n goes to infinite, limn ∞ δt+nBt+n=0.
3  The concept of intertemporal budget constraint is based on the assumption that 
government expects some future tax revenues and based on this expectation, it makes 
the payment on debt at present. For this reason, it is necessary to discount the present-
value of the expected tax revenues in the future. Discounted value is compared with 
government's need to make payments on time t. If the present value of expected 
revenues is equal or higher than the present value of government liabilities, then fiscal 
policy is considered stable.
4 See Hamilton and Flavin (1986); Wilcox (1989); Trahan and Walsh (1991) and
Wickens and Uctum 1993 on testing the transversality condition public debt.
n
n
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 In this case, Trehan and Walsh (1991) sugest that as long 
as the stock of the outstanding debt bt follows a trend stationary 
process and if δt+n grows exponentially, then Bt=∑i=1δt,iSt+i, and IBC 
are satisfied. This means that, to be sustainable, the present debt 
value must equal with the present value of expected surpluses. 
Otherwise, the adjustment of the necessary stabilising measures to 
restore the deficit and public debt at sustainable levels is inevitable. 
In this way, IBC imposes restrictions on the long-run government 
fiscal behaviour regarding the relationship between expenditure 
and revenues. First, it imposes these restrictions not to drift far 
away from one another, by avoiding the creation of large negative 
imbalances between them. Second, it requires the government 
to generate enough future net primary surpluses to pay back the 
outstanding stock of debt. Therefore, if the IBC condition is satisfied, 
then any debt accumulation in the long-term will be defined as 
mean-reverting and the budget will be balanced in present value 
terms [Uctum, (2006)]. 
For growing economies, the assessment of fiscal solvency should 
consider that the economy of a country expands over time with a fixed 
real growth rate [Hakkio and Rush (1991), Cuddington (1997)]. 
This means that debt sustainability depends on size of government 
liabilities and rate of economic growth. Thus, the ability to repay the 
debt grows proportionally to the rate of economic growth. Further, 
high and consistent borrowing rates cannot continue forever due 
to government borrowing capacity and higher costs associated with 
that [Hamilton and Flavin (1986)], and inevitably, the ratio of debt 
to GDP should come to an acceptable level, simply by generating 
positive fiscal surpluses. When the government generates a certain 
level of budget deficit, it implicitly promises that, in the future, it 
will enable positive fiscal surpluses. If high levels of past debt are 
offset by future positive surpluses, then it is possible that debt will be 
mean-reverting. According to Taylor (2002)5, the solvency condition 
should consider the size of debt and the changing economic growth 
rate and therefore, the discounting factor presented by Trehan and 
Walsh (1991) will take the form:
    
 (3)
5  Condition is satisfied as long as 0 <g < r, see Taylor (2002)
* Jδt+n= ∏ i=0 ———
Rt+i
Gt+i
∞
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Where, G=1+g, with g representing the real economic growth rate 
and R=1+r with r representing the real interest rate. IBC is satisfied 
if limn ∞δt+nBt+n=0*  while n goes to infinity. This condition holds if δt* 
follows a stochastic process bounded below by 1+δ* (δ*>0) for the 
expected values and the debt-to-GDP ratio is a stationary process.
Using historical data, many empirical papers6 appraise solvency 
condition and mean-reverting properties based on the data 
generating process (DGP) for discounted debt ratio by unit root 
test techniques. Therefore, the solvency condition was evaluated 
by Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test (ADF). Findings were 
confirmed by Philips-Perron test (PP). This considers testing the null 
hypothesis (H0:π=0) against the alternative (H0:π≠0), while mean-
reverting requires (π<0). T). The rejection of the null hypothesis 
(when π≠0) suggests no unit root is present. This indicates dynamic 
stable behaviour on the bt, while no Ponzi condition is satisfied. The 
IBC then suggests that the government revenue and expenditure 
can continue their past stochastic process without losing market 
confidence. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the present value 
of budget constraint is continually violated and the current policy is 
then not sustainable and has to be changed.
An alternative approach estimates empirically a FP reaction 
function (henceforth FPRF) to test for the transversality condition 
and assess whether the pursued FP avoids excessive debt 
accumulation7. Accordingly, FPRF assumes that in the future the 
government intends to collect enough revenues as to offset the 
present-value of collection costs over time. On the other hand, if 
fiscal authorities react systematically to indebtedness, by raising the 
current or future budget surplus as to ensure the sustainability of 
debt ratio over time, then the transversality condition is satisfied, 
the behaviour of debt to GDP ratio over time is mean-reverting and 
pursued FP avoids excessive debt accumulation [Uctum, (2006)]. 
Such assumptions represent a form of error correction mechanism 
[Bohn, (2005)]. So, the rationale behind this is rooted in the 
6  See also Trehan and Walsh (1991), Sarno (2001), Taylor (2002), Chartareas (2003) 
and Uctum (2006). 
7   See also Afonso (2005) Uctum (2006), Turrin (2008), Lewis (2010), Afonso and 
Jalles (2011) and Escalano (2012).
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government fiscal behaviour based on IBC, while monetary policy 
(MP) is free to adjust its instruments such as money supply or the 
nominal interest rates [Walsh (2003)]. 
Bohn (1998) considers also that the budget balance, D, is a 
function of the degree of indebtedness, B, and a set of control 
variables, Z, of budget balance representing the Barro’s (1979) 
variables, such as output gap and temporary government expenses. 
Using a similar framework, we build and estimate a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model, as follows:
   
(4)
where, Xt and Zt is a vector given by,
Xt = [st, bt] and Zt = [yt, pt, it] 
where, st is a measure of fiscal stance, expressed as the primary 
fiscal surplus (expressed as a percentage of GDP) and reflects the 
correction of an overshot target in the year following its identification, 
bt represents the stock of public debt-to-GDP ratio, yt, represents 
the output gap; pt represents annual inflation rate; it is a measure 
of debt cost servicing; β0 is a vector of constant terms; βi are the 
matrixes of the coefficients measuring lagged effect of variables on 
each other; εt =[εst, εbt,] is the vector of error terms and εt ~ iid(0,σ
2).
The estimation of FPRF, through means of VAR techniques, 
is based on the assumption that IBC reflects primary budget 
surplus and the advantage is twofold. On the one hand, using 
the primary surplus is a reasonable choice, given that the primary 
expenditures are more easily controlled by the government. On 
the other hand, this allows analysing the effects of automatic 
stabilisers and discretionary policy actions. An assessment, on 
the other hand, through budget surplus is important and allows 
the identification of the effect of debt service over the business 
cycle. Besides, following other empirical studies8, we opted for the 
unadjusted primary deficit for three reasons. First, this allows us 
avoiding the numerous shortfalls in the methodology of estimating 
8 See also Girouard and André (2005), Koen and van den Noord (2005), Tagkalakis 
(2010) and Stoica and Leonte (2011).
Xt=β0 ∑i=1 βi Xt-1+∑i=0 βi Zt +εt
qp
~
~
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the cyclically adjusted variables relating to trend/potential output. 
Second, cyclically-adjusted primary surplus may also be affected 
by temporary factors, not directly linked to the cycle, including 
one-off operations, creative accounting and classification errors. 
Finally, with the exception of unemployment-related expenses that 
generally hold a small share in total public expenses, the dynamic 
of public expenses generally reflects discretionary decisions and is, 
hence, not correlated with the business cycle.
To meet the solvency condition, variables on primary surplus and 
debt burden are expressed as a ratio of nominal GDP. The variable 
on primary surplus also represents the moving annualised sum, 
given the high seasonality especially in the last quarter of each year 
in fiscal behaviour. The output gap, yt, entered the model as a RHS 
control variable to allow for the possibility that government pursues 
short-run demand stabilisation [Bohn, (1998)]. It also allows 
considering the impact of the business cycle on the budget deficit, 
depending on the size of automatic stabilisers [de Mello, 2005)]. 
Inflation rate, pt, accounts for shocks to seigniorage revenues [Gali 
and Perroti (2003)] and also symbolizes a policy coordination issue 
between monetary and fiscal authorities [Khalid (2007)]. Thus, we 
have also entered the annual inflation rate into the specified model. 
Further, Laubach (2009) assumes that in recession, monetary 
authority cuts short-term interest rates, long-term interest falls, 
while automatic stabilizers drive up the deficit. Hence, a negative 
correlation exists between interest rate and deficits (or debt), even 
though this is inconclusive about the partial effect of raising cost on 
discretionary spending or tax decision. Under the IMF programme 
and macroeconomic programme, Albania's Government has been 
under pressure to respect a certain level of budget deficit. For this 
reason, we included also the variable on cost of debt servicing to 
capture the partial effect of raising cost on primary surplus.
In the VAR model, we consider that government adjust the st in 
response to changes in bt so as to ensure the sustainability of the 
debt level over time, whilst the set of control variable, Zt, affect st 
or the bt on a later stage and are out of the government control 
or decision-making process. Under such assumptions and the 
Granger and Causality test, the set of control variables enters into 
~
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the model as exogenous variable. Equation 4 would take the matrix 
form (system equations), as follows:
 
 (5.1)
and
(5.2)
where, all variables are explained as above9. The study also 
measures the FPRF through impulse responses of the relevant 
economic variables based on VAR approach. First, FPRF allows to 
distinguish among Ricardian regime by testing the mean-reverting 
properties of the public debt and to localise the effects of other 
factors that normally have an impact on fiscal behaviour. Second, 
the lagged variable in the VAR approach allows us to distinguish 
for inertia in government behaviour and recognise the lack of 
government’s ability to implement appropriate measures to bring a 
significant policy change in a single period, as explained in De Mello, 
(2005) and Burger, (2011). Third, the coefficient and the impulse 
response estimation through VAR approach allow evaluating the 
Albanian FP behaviour at current state and through time.
The literature on the fiscal reaction function approach does not 
place any restrictions on the sign of the estimated coefficients. But, 
under such estimation approach (eq. 5.1), β1,1
p and β1,2  are the two 
key parameters to judge for fiscal solvency. The former (β1,1>0)
is a sign of the tendency that the government tries to increase the 
primary surplus, in order to react to the existing stock of public debt 
and comply with the government budget constraint, while solvency 
requires that raising indebtedness is associated with an increase in 
the primary surplus, (β2,1>0)
10. Hence, in such a regime, making 
the primary surplus a function of government debt allows testing, in 
other words, whether primary budget balances react to government 
debt to ensure fiscal solvency and vice versa. However, Alfonso 
9 In equation 5.1, (st) is a function of government debt (bt) and allow testing for the 
solvency condition based on the Ricardian fiscal regime, while it represents a FPRF 
along the lines of Bohn (1998). According to Afonso and Jalles (2011), equation 5.2 
embodies a standard budget deficit and debt dynamics formulation.
10 See also [Bohn (1998), Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009), Lewis (2009) and Afonso 
and Jalles (2011)] 
p
p pst=β1,0+β1,1st-p+β1,2bt-p+β1,3 yt-1+β1,4 pt-1+β1,5it-1+ε1,t
~
p pbt=β2,0+β2,1st-p+β2,2bt-p+β2,3yt-1+β2,4 pt-1+β2,5it-1+ε2,t 
~
p
p
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(2005) suggests that the solvency condition requires that the size of 
the coefficient should be closer to one and statistically significant. 
Further, according to Uctum (2006), if both unit-root tests and 
the FPRF approaches11 are conducted simultaneously, fiscal 
solvency can be appraised from a different perspective. The former 
approach describes sustainability based on the data-generating 
process characterizing the debt variable. The later reflects the role 
of the government in shaping the fiscal policy and whether it reacts 
to debt position. Analysing through both approaches provides four 
possible ways, as follows:
(i)  Test results are consistent and fiscal policy is sustainable if
  (H0: π≠0) rejected and (β 1,2>0); 
(ii) Test results are consistent and fiscal policy is not sustainable
  if (H0: π≠0) not rejected and (β1,2<0);
(iii) Primary surplus generated by the government has not been 
 sufficient to revert the unsustainable path of fiscal policy and
  further efforts are required if (H0: π≠0) not rejected and (β 1,2<0);
(iv) Fiscal policy is sustainable, but the profligacy of government
  may put it at risk if (H0: π≠0) rejected and (β1,2<0);
Moreover β1,3
 < 0, is evidence of a pro-cyclical policy (β1,3
 >0, 
a countercyclical), which means that primary surplus falls when 
actual output gap rises relatively to potential output, reducing the 
sustainability of the public finances [Turrini (2008) and Dobrescu 
and Salman (2011)]. For developing and transition economies, 
pro-cyclicality is not surprising and is mostly dictated by borrowing 
constraint and financial institutions development [Gavin et al 
(1996)]. We, therefore, expect Albania FP to be pro-cyclical, given 
that rising Albanian indebtedness was associated with raising 
raising interest payments and borrowing constraints12 as financial 
markets and institutions became more conservative during the 
global financial and economic crisis and the public finance crisis 
11  The former approach evaluates solvency on unit root analysis for bt, while the latter 
checks out whether the government reacts to raising debt by generating future primary 
surplus in order to ensure fiscal solvency.  
12  Standart and Poors (S&P) evaluated the long-term external debt with (B+) and 
the domestic debt with (B). Countries with such an assessment are considered as 
economies with a rapid financial volatility. A negative and unstable assessment on 
country risk is not welcomed by the markets and is expected to generate higher rates of 
public debt service, and consequently negative effects arising from it.
p
p
p
p
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in Greece. According to Khalid (2007), the parameter magnitude 
(β1,4>0) assumes that there is a coordination problem between 
fiscal and monetary policies and inflationary pressures are not 
taken into account, and vice versa. Finally, according to Laubach 
(2009), (β1,5<0) assumes that rising debt cost servicing lowers the 
primary surplus and vice versa.
B. DATA
The study focuses on testing the solvency condition and the 
relevance of the existence of a Ricardian fiscal regime is based 
on unit root test on debt-to-GDP ratio and the FPRF approach 
as specified in equations 5.1 and 5.2. The empirical model 
evaluates the FP stance through FPRF approach using policy inertia 
instruments (primary surplus), debt burden, economic fluctuations, 
inflation rate and the variable reflecting interest payments on debt 
stance. The study considers quarterly data from 1998 Q1 to 2010 
Q4 and is based on eq. (4).
Primary surplus is the sum of revenues excluding primary 
expenditure (expenditure minus interest payments) and together 
with stock of government debt (domestic + foreign borrowing) are 
expressed to nominal GDP ratio (the annualised sum of 4 quarters 
nominal GDP). Real public debt (Breal) symbolizes the real public 
debt deflated by Consumer Price Index (CPI). The ratio of real public 
debt (bt
real) is expressed as the ratio of real public debt (defleated by 
CPI) to nominal GDP. It is also generated as the ratio of nominal 
public debt to real GDP (bt
y_real). The time series on public debt and 
primary surplus are taken from the Ministry of Finance. The data on 
the output gap, (y), are taken from the Research Department of the 
Bank of Albania and represents a deviation of nominal GDP from 
potential GDP estimated by the Production Function Cobb-Douglas 
approach [Kota, (2007)]. The data on Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
are taken from the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT). Data on 
inflation rate (p) represent the annualized inflation rate generated 
as [dlog(CPI)x400]. Data on interest payments, (i) are expressed 
as the weighted value of nominal rate of treasury bonds (weighted 
value) and foreign borrowing based on 10-year European bonds 
rate and the flows of domestic and foreign debt borrowing. The 
~
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data on the interest rate of domestic borrowing are taken from the 
Bank of Albania and those for external borrowing are taken from 
the European Central Bank.
The appropriate lag length in the autoregressive unit root test 
process (Appendix A) is based on Schwarz Info Criterion (SIC). After 
conducting Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips Perron (PP) and 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)13 unit-root tests, we find 
conclusive evidence on the stationarity of the variables. Thus, we 
have estimated a VAR model in level. The appropriate one lag 
length on VAR model was based on SIC criteria, stability condition 
and LM test for serial correlation. The model fulfils condition on 
stability, autocorrelation, normality and heteroskedasticity tests.
13 Result on KPSS test can be provided on request.
Chart 1 Budget and primary deficit and explainatory variables
Source: Bank of Albania, Ministry of Finance and European Central Bank
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 3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. UNIT-ROOT TESTS
The data analysis (Chart 1) suggests that the dynamic 
developments in nominal and real public debt are characterised 
by an upward trend during the period in review, while the ratio to 
GDP does not present a clear deterministic trend. Based on this, 
the empirical analysis on b, breal, by_real will include a constant, and 
a constant and a trend on Bnominal and Breal model. The tests on unit 
root are based on equation (4). Findings in Table 2 show that 
the null hypothesis is rejected for b and accepted for by_real and 
breal. According to Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Taylor (2002) 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is stable (stationary) in nominal terms, but 
unstable (non-stationary) in real terms. This is also confirmed by the 
other unit-root test employed, whereas ADF test conclusions on the 
dynamic analysis of Bnominal and Breal are rejected by PP test. In general, 
under this approach, results on b indicate that past high levels are 
offset by positive balances in the future, such as to allow the public 
debt to GDP to be mean-reverting. The no Ponzi condition and 
the Ricardian equivalence are satisfied asymmetrically. But in real 
terms, findings represent a different state of fiscal stance. Based on 
the estimated results, in real terms, debt ratios are unstable and 
therefore IBC condition is not fulfilled. However, this means that the 
final conclusions on long-run mean-reverting behaviour of fiscal 
stance are dictated by the methodology and criteria employed, 
while real economic growth is vital and may play an important 
deterministic role. According to Tanku et al (2007), this means 
that, in the decision-making process, attention should be paid 
to economic policies coordination (monetary and fiscal) in order 
to maintain and accommodate the medium and long-term real 
economic growth.
B. FISCAL POLICY REACTION FUNCTION
Following the previous section, this part checks whether 
governments respond to debt accumulation by generating primary 
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surplus in the manner suggested in equations (5.1) and (5.2), 
and where the feedback coefficients capture these effects. The 
unit root test results, reported in Table 2 in the Appendix, reveal 
that the null unit root hypothesis is rejected at the conventional 
significance statistical level for all or most of the cases. Based on 
conclusive evidence, we can support the stationarity of primary 
surplus, inflation rate, output gap and interest payments on debt 
servicing. Thus, we have estimated a VAR model in level (debt to 
GDP ratio entered the model in level)14. The appropriate one lag 
length on VAR model was based on SIC criteria, stability condition 
and LM test for serial correlation. The model fulfils condition on 
stability, autocorrelation, normality and heteroskedasticity tests. 
Empirical results, (Table 1), all together with impulse 
response function (in Appendix) have brought up some vital 
information for the decision-making process. Results show 
that primary surplus is linked positively to previous balances. 
The coefficient on st-1(β1,1=.5288) is statistically significant at 
conventional level. Accordingly, this reveals that the Albanian fiscal 
policy-makers do analyse the evolution of the previous surplus 
indicator within the decision-making process. The magnitudes of 
primary surplus parameter exhibit substantial inertia in Albanian 
fiscal behaviour, given that the most significant influence is 
caused by previous development on the primary surplus itself. 
According to the impulse response generated by the VAR in level, 
primary surplus grows by .08pp on impact of 1pp shock on itself, 
to reach .05pp after one quarter, to stabilise at about .02pp 
after 6 quarters. But, this effect becomes insignificant after three 
quarters. The accumulated response is .01pp after 1 quarter and 
peaks .02pp after six quarters. This suggests that by the sixth 
quarter, primary surplus is .02pp higher than before the positive 
shock in the variable itself, but this effect diminishes over time.
The coefficient on public debt with one lag (β1,2=-.10) has a 
negative sign and is statistically significant at conventional level. 
This implies that primary surplus will diminish in the following 
period in response to increases in the debt ratio. This entails 
14 We did also estimate a VAR all in level (also debt-to-GDP ratio entered in the first 
difference) and found relatively the same results.
1
1
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that fiscal authorities react systematically to the increasing debt 
ratio, by generating future surpluses, but not enough to fulfil the 
solvency condition and be coherent with the IBC and Ricardian 
fiscal regime. Accordingly, however, the size of the coefficient 
emphasizes that such behaviour is not sufficiently incoherent 
to IBC. Consequently, government fiscal behaviour can be 
considered to be on the bounds of non-Ricardian equivalence. 
Results by impulse response reveal that primary surplus rises 
by .02pp on impact of 1pp positive shock on debt ratio only 
after two quarters, to reach about .03% after four quarters. This 
effect becomes insignificant after 8 quarters. The accumulated 
response is increasing throughout the sample. Impulse response 
suggests that debt ratio would decrease by raising primary 
surplus, but this effect is statistically insignificant. Besides, debt 
ratio would further increase to raising indebtedness, which is 
statistically insignificant. According to Uctum (2006), conducted 
simultaneously results on unit-root tests and FPRF approaches 
imply that FP is sustainable, but the profligacy of fiscal authorities 
put it at risk, considering that the pursued fiscal policies do not 
avoid excessive debt accumulation. This indicates that appropriate 
stabilisation policies are needed so as to bring deficit and debt 
back to a lower and more sustainable level, considering also the 
results by Shijaku and Gjokuta (2012).
With regard to other determining factors, results demonstrate 
that the coefficient of output gap (β3=-.1596) has the expected 
negative sign and is statistically significant at conventional level. 
This means that primary surplus falls by round .1596pp in response 
to 1pp increase in the output gap. This also implies that, during 
the sample period, the reaction of fiscal policy is considered to 
be pro-cyclical, thus putting more risk relating to the position of 
fiscal stance. But, compared with studies for other countries15, this 
magnitude is relatively low. This can be due to weaker transmission 
mechanism in the economy in the case of Albania. Moreover, 
based on the coefficient sign, there seems to be no policy 
coordination problem between fiscal and monetary authorities in 
terms of exchanging information on long-term fiscal and monetary 
strategies.16 Still the estimation coefficient is statistically insignificant, 
15 See: Alfonso, A., (2005), De Mello (2005), Lozano (2010)) and Burger, et. al. (2011).
16 See: Bank of Albania’s Monetary Policy Document, Ministry of Finance’s Economic 
and Fiscal Programme and Luci et. al., (2006).
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and so we cannot draw a firm conclusion. Further, the coefficient 
on debt cost suggests that an increase in cost of debt servicing 
lowers the primary surplus, but this effect is statistically insignificant. 
Table 1 Fiscal policy reaction function based on VAR assumptions
 Sample (adjusted): 1999Q1 2010Q4
 Included observations: 48 after adjustments
 t-statistics in [ ]
st bt
st-1  0.5288 -0.0842
[5.4] [-0.4]
bt-1 -0.10  0.9038
[-2.9] [12.0]
Exogenous Variables
c  0.068029  0.037188
[2.1] [ 0.5]
it -0.1781  0.1863
[-1.3] [ 0.6]
yt -0.1596  0.2826
[-3.2] [ 2.6]
pt -2.68E-03 -1.55E-03
[-0.2] [-0.04]
@TREND  8.98E-05 -9.15E-05
[ 0.5] [-0.2]
 R-squared  0.827014  0.890076
 Adj. R-squared  0.796741  0.870839
 Sum sq. resids  0.002257  0.011088
 F-statistic  27.31886  46.26954
 Akaike AIC -6.793804 -5.201846
 Schwarz SC -6.481937 -4.889979
Source: Authors’ calculations
Finally, Lazano (2010) assumes that any exogenous fiscal 
decision, which cannot be associated with the debt level, the state 
of the economy (output gap) or inflation, is captured by the error 
term εt. Consequently, the error behaviour allows analysing the 
volatility in the discretionary fiscal policy and therefore getting a 
perception of the effects of pursued FP, from a macroeconomic 
volatility perspective. Chart 8 shows error volatility for Albania 
~
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since 1998, drawn from the VAR estimation (eq. 6). Fiscal volatility, 
thus, measured by the standard deviation on the error term is small, 
considering the value (SSR=.002257) on the primary surplus and 
(SSR=.011088) on the debt estimated model. This reveals that 
discretionary fiscal policy has been stable over the sample time, 
but evidences illustrate that volatility has been higher since 2007 
and FP is more unstable when public debt is close to or above the 
60 per cent of GDP ratio. On one hand, this is mainly due to the 
stabilisation and gradual improvement in the macroeconomic and 
fiscal indicators associated with high economic growth rate. On the 
other hand, raising volatility reflects the expansionary fiscal policy 
during 2007 to 2009 and the impact of financial and economic 
crisis on the economic growth rates.
Chart 2 Volatility of fiscal policy based on VAR Standartised 
Residual
Source: Author’s calculations.
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4. CONCLUSION 
This discussion paper focuses on evaluating the long-run 
mean-reverting properties of debt-to-GDP ratio by unit root 
approach and the government reaction function to understand 
whether government pursued appropriate policies to avoid 
excessive debt accumulation. These methods, beyond concluding 
on a deterministic empirical level, allow analysing the stochastic 
behaviour of fiscal policy over time. This will serve to recognize 
the past, analyse it and draw conclusions, serving as a threshold 
to project the future and change it, if necessary. 
Findings demonstrate that the debt to GDP is mean-reverting 
over time, while there seems to be no evidence when this indicator 
is measured in real terms. This is also confirmed by PP test 
approach. Under the FPRF assumption, results demonstrate that 
primary surplus is positively linked to its previous development 
and negatively to raising debt ratio. Accordingly, this reveals that 
Albanian fiscal policy-makers do analyse the evolution of the 
previous surplus indicator within the decision-making process. 
Fiscal authorities react systematically to the increasing debt ratio, 
by generating future surpluses, but not enough to be coherent with 
the IBC and Ricardian fiscal regime. However, considering Alfonso 
(2005) the size of the coefficient emphasizes that such behaviour 
is not sufficiently incoherent to IBC. Consequently, government 
fiscal behaviour can be considered to be on the bounds of non-
Ricardian equivalence. According to Uctum (2006), conducted 
simultaneously results on unit root tests and FPRF approaches imply 
that FP is sustainable, but the profligacy of fiscal authorities put it 
at risk, considering that the pursued fiscal policies do not avoid 
excessive debt accumulation.
With regard to other determining factors, results demonstrate 
that during the sample period fiscal authorities’ reaction is pro-
cyclical, thus putting more risk relating to the position of fiscal 
stance. However, compared with other studies, this magnitude is 
relatively low. There seems to be no policy coordination problem 
between fiscal and monetary authorities, considering the exchange 
of information on long-term fiscal and monetary strategies. Still 
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the estimation is insignificant, and so we cannot draw a firm 
conclusion. Moreover, raising cost of debt servicing will lower the 
primary surplus, but this effect is statistically insignificant. Results 
suggest that discretionary fiscal policy has been stable over the 
sample time, but evidence illustrates that the volatility has been 
higher since 2007 and FP is more unstable when public debt is 
close to or above the 60 per cent of GDP ratio. On one hand, 
this is mainly due to the stabilisation and gradual improvement 
in the macroeconomic and fiscal indicators associated with high 
economic growth rate. On the other hand, raising volatility reflects 
the expansionary fiscal policy during 2007 to 2009 and the impact 
of financial and economic crisis on the economic growth rates.
However, the model takes an empirical approach based on 
developments in the past, while the sustainability of fiscal policy 
depends on macroeconomic conditions, especially in the future. 
On the other hand, unit-root approach fails to capture any possible 
structural breaks and nonlinear behaviour in the time series [Uctum 
et al (2006)], while the mean-reverting assumption does not 
provide a deterministic level when debt ratio revert towards high 
or lower levels. Thus, future research will consider nonlinear unit-
root test or Smooth Transition Autoregressive model (STAR) and 
Threshold Autoregressive models (TAR) to capture the reverting 
level of debt ratio. Moreover, despite progress in macroeconomic 
indicators over time, the slowdown in economic growth during 
financial and economic crisis, the need for reforms of the pension 
fund, financing the strategic sectors like infrastructure, water supply, 
health, education and structural reforms, the importance of fiscal 
discipline and European perspective in the long term will keep alive 
the debate on fiscal sustainability over a long time. Further, future 
research will also consider a structural VAR approach, notably with 
variables entering the model as endogenous.
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APPENDIX 
Table 2 Unit-Root Tests 
Variables
ADF test Phillips-Perron test 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root Null Hypothesis: Unit Root
Level First Difference Level First Difference
[Prob.] Laga [Prob.] Laga [Prob.] Bandëidthb [Prob.] Bandwidthb
Intercept
b [.0001] 4 [.1279] 4 [.0931] 1 [.0000] 3
Bnominal [.9736] 6 [.0332] 5 [.9645] 2 [.0000] 2
Breal [.4840] 5 [.0439] 4 [.6052] 4 [.0000] 5
bt
real [.6096] 5 [.0279] 4 [.4387] 2 [.0000] 6
bt
y_real [.1099] 4 [.3124] 3 [.3708] 8 [.0000] 6
s [.2864] 0 [.0000] 0 [.1786] 2 [.0000] 1
y [.0123] 4 [.0000] 2 [.0000] 17 [.0000] 13
p [.0077] 5 [.0000] 3 [.0000] 13 [.0001] 11
i [.0062] 1 [.0012] 0 [.0009] 2 [.0018] 2
Intercept and Trend
b [.0014] 4 [.0001] 0 [.5003] 2 [.0001] 5
Bnominal [.0388] 4 [.3299] 4 [.8974] 0 [.0000] 2
Breal [.0859] 5 [.1250] 4 [.5654] 3 [.0000] 6
bt
real [.0058] 5 [.0575] 4 [.4336] 3 [.0002] 9
bt
y_real [.0360] 4 [.5552] 3 [.5611] 6 [.0000] 7
s [.6461] 0 [.0002] 0 [.4787] 2 [.0002] 1
y [.0399] 4 [.0000] 2 [.0000] 20 [.0000] 13
p [.0448] 5 [.0000] 3 [.0000] 12 [.0001] 11
i [.0089] 1 [.0029] 0 [.0179] 2 [.0034] 2
None 
b [.7319] 4 [.0157] 4 [.9145] 2 [.0000] 3
Bnominal [.9932] 6 [.3201] 3 [1.0000] 1 [.0000] 0
Breal [.9629] 5 [.0340] 4 [.9997] 0 [.0000] 1
bt
real [.5648] 5 [.0017] 4 [.7004] 2 [.0000] 6
bt
y_real [.8688] 4 [.1087] 3 [.9902] 4 [.0000] 2
s [.1118] 0 [.0000] 0 [.0763] 2 [.0000] 1
y [.0008] 4 [.0000] 2 [.0000] 16 [.0000] 13
p [.4179] 7 [.0000] 3 [.0000] 46 [.0000] 11
i [.0001] 0 [.0034] 2 [.0023] 3 [.0002] 2
a Automatic lag selection based on SC criteria
b New-West Bandwidth selection through using the Bartlett Kernel 
~
~
~
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Chart 3 Impulse Response of a 1% primary surplus and 
public debt shock in levels VAR (1)
Response to Cholesky One S.D Innovations ± 2S.E
Response of PD_ANNUAL to PD_ANNUAL
Response of DEBT_RATIO to PD_ANNUAL Response of DEBT_RATIO to DEBT_RATIO
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Chart 4 Cumulative Impulse Response of a 1% primary 
surplus and public debt shock in levels VAR (1) 
Accumulated Response to Cholesky One S.D Innovations ± 2S.E
Accumulated Response of PD_ANNUAL to PD_ANNUAL
Accumulated Response of DEBT_RATIO to PD_ANNUAL Accumulated Response of DEBT_RATIO to DEBT_RATIO
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 3 VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h
Sample: 1997 Q4 2010 Q4
Included observations: 48
Lags LM-Stat Prob.
1  2.935339  0.5687
2  2.588490  0.6289
3  8.689315  0.0694
4  6.842975  0.1444
5  8.213043  0.0841
6  0.796874  0.9389
7  3.539097  0.4720
8  4.220205  0.3770
9  0.844718  0.9324
10  2.343287  0.6729
11  0.871584  0.9286
12  6.140582  0.1889
Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
Table 4 AR Residual Normality Tests
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal
Sample: 1997 Q4 2010 Q4
Included observations: 48
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.408387  1.334240 1  0.2481
2  0.383382  1.175851 1  0.2782
Joint  2.510092 2  0.2851
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  1.730928  3.221085 1  0.0727
2  2.316164  0.935264 1  0.3335
Joint  4.156350 2  0.1252
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  4.555326 2  0.1025
2  2.111116 2  0.3480
Joint  6.666441 4  0.1546
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